The Human Side of Technological Innovation: A Battle for American Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency
Abbey Zhao | Sam Kunin
Ohio––where I’m from—is all too used to unfulfilled promises. High-speed passenger rail, for one––a train connecting the three major cities––has been “in the works” for decades. The Intel semiconductor plant is another, with its opening date pushed back to 2030 from 2025. The jobs promised with this opening, as a result, haven’t materialized, a development that stands at odds with the significant tax breaks and other incentives Ohio extended to the company. Like many Ohioans, I’m wondering how much effort is being put into American self-sufficiency to win the chip war.
Although bills like the CHIPS Act have been passed, Trump’s efforts to diminish American research capability have put the country further behind in the race. It’s imperative that the U.S. resume fighting; government, not corporate, intervention should be adopted to ensure we cross this divide. We need to focus on human capital transfer rather than knowledge transfer alone and adopt policies that allow for smoother pathways for potential talent. In particular, we should reconsider the current immigration atmosphere and promote integrated connections between academia and R&D through new funding initiatives.
The Significance of Semiconductors
The leading manufacturer of the most advanced chips, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), developed plants in Arizona in 2022 and plans to invest another $165 billion in American facilities. Such chips are used in cars, phones, laptops, AI systems, servers, and more, all sectors that have seen recent rises. This investment shows there’s promise in our improvement—why else would TSMC dedicate so many resources?
Under President Biden, the U.S. introduced the CHIPS Act after Chinese escalation in the South China Sea ramped up, aimed at “carry[ing] out activities relating to the creation of incentives to produce semiconductors in the United States,” in hopes of strengthening U.S. tech and reducing reliance on foreign countries. Yet, despite the act, manufacturing is 50% more expensive than in Taiwan, leaving the U.S. with a diminished capacity. As a result, American semiconductor demand continues to outpace supply.
For Taiwan, the semiconductor industry can be seen as a shield against China’s grip on the market—it’s even dubbed the “Silicon Shield.” It had a global market share of 78.1% within manufacturing in 2024, making the U.S. so reliant on Taiwan that the partnership’s loss could create a “greater negative impact on the U.S. economy than the 2008 global financial crisis.” It is argued that this reliance will protect Taiwan if Sino-Taiwanese tensions escalate; however, under Trump’s more protectionist stance, this reliance is slipping. Moreover, if Taiwan decides to take a stance against the United States, then America stands at a loss.
What puts the U.S. behind
While it’s evident America is taking steps to address this vulnerability, all of these actions only try to cover the symptoms rather than address the root cause. Simply building more plants and stockpiling materials cannot solve the larger issue. While resource allocation presents an issue, as production is most efficient when the manufacturer is geographically proximate to its inputs, human capital shortages pose a larger threat.
More importantly, Taiwan has been proactive in cultivating talent in a way that the United States has not been. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, Taiwan has advantages from funding investment incentives in R&D, collaborations between industry and academia, and the establishment of science parks, which provide infrastructure, access to talent, and regulatory support.
The U.S.’ semiconductor industry isn’t as unified across departments, research institutions, and the private sector. The opportunities that Taiwanese chip companies offer aren’t as available in the United States; perhaps that’s why local talents stay in Taiwan. America isn’t keeping pace with Taiwan’s technological innovation; it’s only been in the past couple of years that coverage truly increased, compared to Taiwan’s long-lasting dominance in the sphere.
There are only so many advantages that knowledge and capital transfers can provide; it’s not a question of what we want, but who provides it.
Bridging the gap
The U.S. should follow the playbook of the Soviet Scientists Immigration Act of 1992 (SSIA). This act simplified the process for Soviet talent, particularly those in nuclear, chemical, or biological technologies, to obtain U.S. visas. Its main premise omitted the requirement for employer sponsorships or completing the labor certification process, and as a result, 750 scientists were able to emigrate through the program. Overall, the “synthesis of Russian brainpower and American technology [led] to new approaches to problem-solving,” and refreshed the U.S. scientific landscape with new ideas and techniques.
America should attract Taiwanese talent and also those from emerging countries within the industry, such as South Korea and Japan. This will be a difficult line to draw; these states are seen as westernized and our allies along the Pacific. We don’t want to seem like we’re poaching their talent and creating increased distance from them in an already fragile international environment. However, such unity can also strengthen bilateral relationships, as such research can flow both ways and benefit from both environments.
So how can America execute this balancing act? To start, waive Trump’s new 100k fee on obtaining H1B visas—a common work visa—for deserving talent in hopes that one day we can extend this once more to exempting employer sponsorship. In this current immigration atmosphere, it is too much to immediately ask for exemptions, and the adoption of a program similar to the H1B1 visa—a program with quotas for Singaporeans and Chileans not subject to the fee—allows a smoother transition.
The visa process also needs to be expedited, allowing talent to jump ahead in line, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic caused widespread backlogs. An immense amount of complex legal paperwork is needed, so dedicating a small team to provide assistance is also necessary. While there are more roadblocks within the immigration system, these are the most important first steps.
Moreover, there is a need to simulate the environment the scientists are used to abroad. We should better facilitate the research process, offer monetary incentives, and provide unparalleled opportunities for the exchange of ideas. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 showed the importance of academia in improving technological innovation; after all, education is the incubator of human capital. The act allows for universities to retain patent rights for inventions made with federal funding, but this emphasizes more marketable inventions, which can skew research priorities and stifle collaboration. By broadening the act’s scope to include non-commercial and early-stage projects, or including provisions to cross over between industry and university, more innovation can be accessed.
To increase funding and promote R&D growth, politicians should reconsider the NIST American Technology Program, a combined government-industry program that assisted many successful inventions through private capital and federal funding. It was repealed in 2007 after budgetary constraints and ideological opposition. Some criticism was valid, such as complaints about overly broad subject areas. This issue could be remedied by choosing to focus on specific industries: for us, this would be semiconductors. If they had America’s interest at heart, politicians would cross the partisan divide to promote development.
Importantly, we need to identify which specific aspects of the production process we want talent from. We need to walk the line between attracting and taking talent. It will be necessary to go global, consulting with our allies across Europe. The U.S. has a diasporic population of researchers who hold a variety of perspectives, which is an advantage Taiwan does not possess. It is imperative that America takes advantage of every opportunity it has.
Is this even possible?
Maybe not. Without explicit government support, specifically in the Research and Development sphere, Taiwan will pull ahead. Trump has scrutinized the CHIPS Act, and the cuts on research will hamper technological innovation. Our government just had a record-long 43-day shutdown, and the refusal to bridge the partisan divide is a harbinger of the conflict to come over this discussion. Researchers have fled to more welcoming environments abroad. With such a clear lack of regard for scientific innovation, these policies face a significant challenge in even being taken seriously, much less being installed.
Government policies and funding are required for success. Private companies can only do so much; enforcing a specific framework allows for increased transparency that moves America forward.
But if the implementations of improved visa processes and bolstered research opportunities are successful, we can apply them to other technology-heavy fields where the country also lacks capacity.
Abbey Zhao (Columbia College ‘28) is a writer for the Columbia Emerging Markets Review studying economics and statistics with a minor in political science. She is interested in how policy interplays with innovation, and how that drives forth domestic and international economic growth.