Navigating Ties and New Tracks: The Shifting Geopolitical and Economic State of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway
Since 1997, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project – a proposed 454 kilometer link slicing through Central Asia – has been “in the works.” The project’s periodic pauses spanning two decades emphasize the pressure of the region’s leaders in unraveling the geopolitical entanglements and economic tensions that have repeatedly stalled its progress in a region where Russia has long held sway.
Before the most recent signing ceremony on June 6, 2024 in Beijing, attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the CKU railway’s progress had stalled repeatedly. Disputes over routing, financing, and differing strategic priorities prompted more years of hesitation and continued research of the project’s feasibility. However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War catalyzed by Russia’s February 2022 invasion emphasized the risks for both China and the various Central Asian countries relying on traditional northern trade routes that pass through Russian territory. Calling for the urgent need to both diversify their transit networks and untangle their economies from dependency on Russia, the three CKU partners reunited at the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand to finalize the official construction roadmap.
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have remained tethered to Russia’s economic and security orbit and operations, a legacy of the Soviet Union. From energy pipelines to railways, Central Asia has functioned as both a buffer zone and an industrial extension of Russian power.The “Great Game” of the 19th century when the Russian empire competed with the British in furthering their influence in Central Asia resulted in the establishment of the first railway in Central Asia connecting Tashkent to the Caspian Sea. Though, recently, the bloc formation linking the economic markets of post-Soviet states in Central Asia through security guarantees and integration efforts like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of 1992 and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) of 2015 have been weakening. This is largely due to a combination of conflicts and political moves. Moscow’s inability to mediate the 2022 Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border clashes Kyrgyzstan’s withdrawal from the CSTO, and Central Asian countries’ increasing negative sentiment directed towards Russia diminished their desire to continue to partner with Russia as the region’s security guarantor.
With Russia’s hold on the region loosening, China has been asserting itself through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the CKU railway developing into a bold and critical pathway that could further weaken Russia’s infrastructural grip. By carving 900 kilometers (about 560 miles) off the route between China and Europe and shaving eight days off transit times, the CKU railway offers undeniable logistical advantages. The route unlocks access to Southeast and Western Asia as well as Turkish and Middle Eastern markets for landlocked Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The route also positions China to dodge bottlenecks in their existing trade routes such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, providing flexibility during crises. As part of BRI, the railway expands China’s strategic aim to cement their leadership in investing in regional connectivity while insulating itself from the geopolitical volatility of over-reliance on northern routes. To achieve this, China, as the project’s largest financial backer, is expected to cover half of the $4.7 billion cost.
For Uzbekistan, the railway project aligns with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s ambitious economic liberalization agenda. It promises the shortest route to European markets, bypassing Russian-controlled corridors and potentially positioning Uzbekistan as a regional trade hub.
Although this impressive trade route promises new jobs and increased economic activity, it could come at a cost far heavier than the $200 million in projected annual revenue generated through transit fees. Officially estimated at $4.7 billion, the construction cost is expected to be shared among the partners, with China covering half and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan taking on the rest. Given the challenging mountainous terrain along approximately 80 percent of the entire route, Marat Shibutov, a Kazakh political scientist and member of presidential advisory body, voiced how the total cost could rise to $10–12 billion, far exceeding initial projections.
Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the railway project is both a critical opportunity and a daunting financial challenge. The country is required to contribute $700 million in equity, securing a 24.5 percent stake in the three-way joint venture. However, Kyrgyz railway officials have announced plans to fund 51 percent of the project through a $2.3 billion loan from China. While this approach fulfills their short-term funding needs, it echoes an all-too-familiar narrative of China’s debt trap diplomacy in BRI projects.
To mitigate financial exposure, the project is structured as a public-private partnership. In this arrangement, private investments are managed by the joint venture, with foreign state-owned entities from China and Uzbekistan controlling a combined 75.5 percent stake. This structure reduces Kyrgyzstan’s financial risk but comes at a strategic cost: the country will neither fully own nor control its section of the railway. This contrasts Central Asian countries’ traditional tendencies of maintaining sovereign control over strategic infrastructure, including other railways, pipelines, and high-voltage transmission lines.
Disputes over the railway’s route add another layer of complexity. China and Uzbekistan have pushed for a southern path, while Kyrgyzstan has advocated for a northern route. These disagreements reveal the difficulties of aligning national interests on such an ambitious scale. Even if the project comes to fruition, competition from more efficient transit networks in Kazakhstan and Russia could further undermine Kyrgyzstan’s ability to capitalize on its role as a transit point.
As Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan work to bring this route to life, they confront the delicate balance between their historical ties to Russia and their deepening connection with China. Uzbekistan's Minister of Transport, Ilkhom Mahkamov, announced plans to begin construction in October 2024, and there have not been any significant updates or publicized movements to its timelines. The uncertainty surrounding the progression in the CKU railway program reflects the ambition of Central Asia’s step forward towards reclaiming its Silk Road legacy without Russia.
Bylines:
Celine Kiriscioglu (BC ‘27) is a writer for the Columbia Emerging Markets Review studying economics and sociology. She's passionate about the financing of global infrastructure projects and exploring how innovation in energy, agriculture, and technology drive economic transformation and reshape geopolitical landscapes.
Sydney Smith (Trinity / GS ‘26) is a managing editor for the Columbia Emerging Markets Review studying Classical Civilization. She is interested in clean energy in emerging economies, as well as geopolitical analysis.
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