BIOSECURE or Bioindependent: U.S. Protectionism Risks Undermining Its Own Supply Chain

As geopolitical tensions between the United States and China rise, the U.S. has taken an increasingly hardline stance on decoupling from Chinese biotechnology.  The most recent example of this is the BIOSECURE Act, recently passed by the House of Representatives, that prohibits federally funded entities from using biotechnology equipment or services from companies associated with a foreign adversary.  The bill prohibits contracting with Chinese biotech firms that pose a risk to national security on the basis of their research or use of multi-omic data collection (e.g., collection of genomic information).  While this measure is only part of the broader movement towards protectionism and revitalizing American ingenuity, it may cripple the very industry that it intends to safeguard.  Drawing from current disruptions to U.S.-China biotech collaboration and the Trump Trade War, it is evident that the BIOSECURE Act is a well-intentioned mirror of prior miscalculations.  If implemented without caution or nuance, reducing access to Chinese Contract Research Organizations (CROs), and manufacturers would destabilize pharmaceutical supply chains, reduce the United States’ ability to compete in global biotechnology innovation, and push China towards increased self-sufficiency.

China’s Role in The Global Biotech Supply Chain

The BIOSECURE Act most notably targets Wuxi AppTec and BGI Genomics, preventing them from securing partnerships with American entities that receive federal funding.  Proponents of the bill allege that these companies work with the People’s Liberation Army as part of the larger military-civil fusion strategy of the Chinese Communist Party, posing threats to patient data privacy.  Wuxi AppTec has denied these allegations, despite U.S. intelligence officials discovering them sharing U.S. client data with Beijing without consent.  In spite of these security breaches, it is difficult to ignore the sheer scale of China’s participation in global Research & Development. China has become a hub for CROs, global clinical trial management, as well as the largest supplier of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).  According to Globalization and Health, over half of U.S. drug trials involve the work of Chinese CROs and 40% of global APIs originate in China.  Even U.S. giants, Pfizer and Moderna, rely on Chinese partners for rapid development and cost-effective services.

Echoes of the Past: 2018–2020 U.S.-China trade war

During Trump’s previous administration, tariffs were imposed on various Chinese imports—including pharmaceutical precursors.  The result was a shortage of supplies, rising drug prices, and manufacturers struggling to meet the demand.  The administration continued with Executive Order 13944, which mandated essential medicines procured by the federal government to be sourced domestically.  This national security measure did not take into account the global interdependence of pharmaceutical manufacturing and strained domestic facilities early-on during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE), medical devices, antibiotics, and active pharmaceutical ingredients.  Cutting off supply chains before establishing domestic replacements leads to bottlenecks and public health vulnerabilities.   

The consequences of this legislation and Trump’s Trade War are already visible, with China banning imports of U.S.-made Illumina gene sequencers and prompting uncertainty in the genomic research community.  U.S. companies are already feeling the strain, as increased costs and reduced speed in bringing drugs to trial especially hinder the progress of early-stage firms.    Furthermore, U.S. venture capitalists are already pulling funds from companies that rely on Chinese CROs or manufacturing, fearing the regulatory blowback.

False Security and Envisioning a Smarter Solution  

The BIOSECURE Act rests on the false binary that national security and global collaboration are mutually exclusive.  Though well-intentioned, BIOSECURE threatens to undo global progress in pharmaceutical innovation.  The biotechnology sector has thrived on its globalized Research & Development model, where innovation and manufacturing span continents.  Additionally, many of these restricted firms are already invested in U.S.-based infrastructure, such as Wuxi AppTec’s FDA-inspected facilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  Severing ties with China’s biotechnology sector isolates the United States; global rivals surge ahead and patients bear the brunt in higher drug costs.

Rather than unspecified and indiscriminate bans, national security vetting for CROs should resemble the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFUIS) in considering foreign direct investments.  Rather than straining existing companies, incentivizing domestic CRO expansion should focus on federal procurement and expanding the FDA’s global inspection network to ensure quality standards abroad.  Strategic diversification rather than a strict decoupling from Chinese biotech protects national interests without sacrificing U.S. pharmaceutical supply chains, innovation, and affordability.  The false binary that national security and global collaboration are mutually exclusive, exemplifies a larger misconception—that the U.S. must choose between total dependence and total autonomy.  To truly lead in biotech innovation, the U.S. must reject reactionary policies and improve the resilience of domestic manufacturing.  This is the nature of a sophisticated and globally integrated model.

Natalie Popilevsky (Barnard/JTS 26’) is a writer for the Columbia Emerging Markets Review studying biology, cognitive science, and Jewish ethics.  She is interested in foreign investments in biotechnology.

Sydney Smith (Trinity / GS ‘26) is a managing editor for the Columbia Emerging Markets Review studying classical civilization. She is interested in clean energy in emerging economies, as well as geopolitical analysis.